

Felony Case (Tel Aviv) 1137/02

State of Israel v. Nasser Mahmoud Ahmad Aweis

The Courts

Tel Aviv – Jaffa District Court

Felony Case 001137/02

Before: The Hon. Judge S. Timan – Presiding Judge
The Hon. Judge N. Achituv
The Hon. Judge O. Salomon-Czerniak

May 1, 2003

In the matter of: State of Israel
represented by Counsel: Adv. Devora Chen and
Adv. Tamar Anis

v.

Nasser Mahmoud Ahmad Aweis
represented by Counsel: Adv. Bulus

The State of Israel is arguing that these organizations are terrorist organizations, pursuant to their definition in the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, and that the Defendant, who played a senior role therein as described, initiated, organized and launched murderous terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in the State of Israel and in the Judea and Samaria region, and that his activity included, *inter alia*, the purchase and production of weapons of various kinds and the transfer thereof, whether directly or indirectly, to the terrorists who actually perpetrated the terrorist attacks on behalf of the terrorist organization.

Verdict

Judge O. Salomon-Czerniak:

The charge

The State of Israel is arguing that, during the period of time that is relevant to the events that are described in the indictment, the Defendant was the Commander of the Nablus and Northern Samaria area of the Tanzim-Fatah organization, as well as the commander of the *Kitaab Shuhadaa al-Aqsa* (al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades) organization in that area.

The State of Israel is arguing that these organizations are terrorist organizations, according to the definition thereof in the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708 – 1948, and that the Defendant, who played a senior role therein as described, initiated, organized and launched murderous terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in the State of Israel and in Judea and Samaria, and that his activity included, *inter alia*, the purchase and production of weapons of various kinds and the transfer thereof, whether directly or indirectly, to the terrorists who actually perpetrated the terrorist attacks on behalf of the terrorist organization.

[Stamp] P 5: 237

The State of Israel is arguing that, as a result of the Defendant's actions, many civilians were murdered, wounded and injured, and it is seeking to convict him, as set forth in the eight counts that are included in the indictment, of the offenses that are attributed to him, which are: Membership and activity in a terrorist organization – offenses in contravention of Sections 2 and 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708 – 1948.

Acts of conspiracy to commit a crime – offenses in contravention of Section 499 of the Penal Code, 5737 – 1977.

Acts of murder and attempts to perpetrate such acts – offenses in contravention of Sections 300 (a) (2) and 305 (1) of the Penal Code, 5737 – 1977.

Acts of aggravated assault and attempts to perpetrate such acts – offenses in contravention of Sections 329 (1) and 329 (1) [sic] in combination with Section 25 of the Penal Code, 5737 – 1977.

Unlawfully carrying a weapon – offenses in contravention of Section 144 (b) of the Penal Code, 5737 – 1977.

The Defendant's line of defense

In the initial stage, the Defendant hired the services of Adv. Bulus and cooperated with him.

The defense attorney received all of the investigative material, and even filed a notice that he would raise various preliminary arguments on behalf of the Defendant, including the argument of the absence of jurisdiction.

A first harbinger of the future line of defense of the Defendant is to be found in the transcript of the session which took place on September 10, 2002. At that session, the defense attorney (before another panel of judges) argued, *inter alia*, that: "After I had explained the matter to him, he said that he did not want an attorney, that he was representing himself. We hope that, within a short time, we will be able to push the deliberations forward – a period of at least two weeks."

At the same session – as may be seen in the transcript – the Defendant said to his attorney, and through the interpreter: "Do not speak on my behalf. I am my own lawyer; I am representing myself." Even at that stage, the Court ruled that: "Adv. Bulus' firm will continue to represent the Defendant, even if the latter decides to conduct the hearing on his own."

At the session which took place on January 22, 2003 (before the other panel), the defense attorney gave notice as follows: "We withdraw from the argument of an absence of jurisdiction. I agree that there was a ruling that a summation be filed within 30 days with

[Stamp] P 5: 238

regard to the argument of the absence of jurisdiction. However, in light of the developments which took place on the subject of Barghouti and in view of the decision on the part of the District Court to reject the argument, we have decided to withdraw the argument of an absence of jurisdiction in this case.”

The defense attorney subsequently filed a petition to release him from representation, and the petition was denied in our ruling of March 2, 2003.

The trial began, continued and concluded in the presence of the Defendant and his attorney, and was fully translated into Arabic. The Defendant and his attorney remained silent throughout. They did not file a response to the indictment (we considered that as tantamount to a plea of not guilty on all counts). They did not raise any preliminary arguments, they did not cross-examine any witnesses and they did not raise any legal arguments. The Defendant did not testify and no witnesses were brought forth on his behalf. They even chose not to present a summation.

This position shall be examined against the background of the notice given in writing by the defense attorney, as follows:

[Stamp] P 5: 238 [continued]

“... 4. The undersigned spoke with the Defendant on several occasions and attempted to convince him to accept legal representation by an attorney. However, the Defendant has chosen not to be represented by an attorney.

5. The undersigned explained to the Defendant that he is supposed to represent his interests at the trial. In response, the Defendant clarified that he had decided not to take an active part in the trial proceeding. He is entitled to make his own choices and to take the actions which he has chosen for himself, including by means of a passive line of defense of silence throughout his trial.

6. The Defendant has requested that, if the Court forces us to appear at sessions, the only thing that we may do is to remain silent.

7. On March 11, 2003, and following the ruling by the Honorable Court, the undersigned again explained to the Defendant the ruling by Their Honor and his own situation, as well as the fact that, if a legal argument is raised in the course of the session, it is fitting and proper for the undersigned to address it. The Defendant, however, ruled out that possibility and repeated his former statement, to the effect that he is not interested in cooperating and that he does not consider us to be his defense attorneys, and again asked us to remain silent...

10. The Defendant is perfectly well aware of the meaning of all this. He is not legally incompetent and he has the mental and intellectual capacity to choose how to conduct the trial...

13. In the absence of cooperation by the Defendant, and [in view of] his instructions to the defense attorney to remain silent throughout the trial, not to examine witnesses and/or raise legal and/or other arguments, not to speak on his behalf and/or to raise factual and/or legal arguments, the undersigned has no choice but to hold his tongue, and will be enjoined from doing otherwise, for obvious reasons originating in the rules of ethics which bind any attorney at law...”

We are convinced, on the basis of that which has been set forth in the notice, oral statements made to us in the matter, and the behavior of the Defendant and his attorney prior to and at all times throughout the trial, that the Defendant has adopted a position which reflects a line of defense which he selected knowingly, deliberately and of his own free will.

What is before us is a choice which results from a calculated, deliberate, conscious, intentional and manipulative move made by a Defendant who understands perfectly well, and who is quite aware of, all of the implications thereof.

The Defendant was given, at all times, every possibility of taking an active role in the deliberations. We even attempted to urge his attorney to do his job in any way he could, even in the absence of any cooperation by the Defendant, and at the very least, where purely legal argumentation was involved.

[Stamp] P 5: 239

The distinguished defense attorney explained, yet again, that he would not intervene in the deliberations, even where legal argumentation was involved, because he was bound by the line of defense adopted by his client.

In other words, we are not looking at an unintentional failure to act, or at indifference to the consequences, but rather, at a clear and definitive line of defense.

The Defendant and his defense attorney may be presumed to have been aware, from the outset, of the legal consequences of this line of defense.

The Defendant's confessions

The Defendant confessed to the offenses that were attributed to him in the indictment, within the framework of his statements to the police.

[Stamp] P 5: 239 [continued]

Statements P/5 dated April 21, 2002, P/6 dated April 28, 2007, P/7 dated April 30, 2002, P/8 dated May 1, 2002 and P/9 dated May 14, 2002, were written on the basis of the testimony of Witness No. 5 for the prosecution, an interrogator in the Hostile Terrorist Activity Unit, Roni Amar, in Arabic, in the Defendant's handwriting and after he had explained to the Defendant in Arabic the charges that were being attributed to him and had duly warned him. According to the interrogator's testimony, after the Defendant had confirmed to him that he understood the charges and the nature of the warning, he asked to write the statements in his own handwriting and did so of his own free will.

According to the interrogator's testimony, the Defendant signed the statements before him. The interrogator translated the statements from Arabic to Hebrew (the translation of each statement into Hebrew, P/5A through P/9A, is attached to the respective statement).

Statement P/22, dated June 27, 2002, was taken by Witness No. 7 for the prosecution, interrogator Hadi Halabi, who explained that he took the testimony in the Arabic language, in which he is fluent, after the Defendant had been duly warned, had understood the nature of the interrogation and the warning, and had given his statements of his own free will and volition. The Defendant signed the statement that the interrogator had recorded in Arabic. This interrogator also translated the statement into Arabic and the translation is appended to the statement: (P/22A).

The circumstances under which the statements were taken down in the manner described above, the fact that the overwhelming majority thereof (five out of six statements) were written by the Defendant in his own handwriting, and the fact that the Defendant again confirmed before a military judge (see the transcript of the Court session at which his arrest was extended, P/23, and the testimony by Witness No. 5 for the prosecution) that "I confirm that the assertions and the confessions which I gave in my interrogation in Arabic are true and correct, and that I read them and that I signed them. It is true that I was involved in all of the actions and the terrorist attacks to which I confessed – 'everyone has his job to do'. I do not object to the extension of my arrest as requested." all indicate that this evidence is admissible. There is no reason to suspect that the Defendant was subjected to external pressure which led him to confess to the perpetration of acts in which he had no part.

Examination of the content of the statements, including the confessions, indeed shows that what they contain is a true reflection of the actual state of affairs, on the basis of clear, lucid and logical thinking by a person of sound and settled mind. These statement and confessions carry heavy internal weight which, in and of itself, bears out their veracity.

Obviously, the Defendant's confession before a judge in arrest court, and under the supervision of that judge, was given without any pressure or influence and, as that confession implies severe consequences for the Defendant, it constitutes material corroboration of evidence and carries a special weight, which increases the force of his previous admissions, over and above its strength as an independent item of evidence (see Additional Hearing 3081/91, Kuzali v. State of Israel, PD 45 (4) 441, Criminal Appeal 6613/99, Stephen Smirek v. State of Israel, PD 56 (3) 529, and Criminal Appeal 3338/99, PD 54 (5) 667).

[Stamp] P 5: 240

The requirement for an additional “item,” which allays the suspicion that the Defendant was led to confess by internal pressure, has been completely fulfilled by the assertions that have been made in writing, out of court, by other witnesses, which we accept as admissible and credible evidence, as shall be set forth below.

The accomplices

Witnesses for the prosecution [REDACTED] (Witness No. 6 for the prosecution), [REDACTED] (Witness No. 21 for the prosecution), [REDACTED] (Witness No. 23 for the prosecution) and [REDACTED] (Witness No. 25 for the prosecution), are the Defendant’s accomplices in the offenses committed by him (hereinafter: the “Four”). With the exception of Witness No. 6 for the prosecution, [REDACTED], who was convicted and sentenced before he testified (see the respective protocols of his conviction and sentencing, jointly marked at P/11), the other three were called upon to testify before their own trial ended, and the question arose as to whether their testimony was admissible, in view of the Kinzi doctrine

[Stamp] P 5: 240 [continued]

(Criminal Appeal 194/75, Menahem Kinzi v. State of Israel, PD 30 (2) 477), a doctrine which has admitted no flexibility to date (see Criminal Appeal 1774/02, Shimon Kadosh v. State of Israel), which holds that “one defendant should not be made to testify before another defendant, even if separate indictments were filed against them, as long as there is any suspicion that the witness is likely to expect the benefit of reduction of his sentence, in a trial which is still pending against him. This can be avoided either by completing [the witness’s] trial before the testimony is given or by transforming him into a State’s witness and arranging for a stay of the proceedings, or a declaration by the prosecution that the trial against him will be canceled upon the conclusion of his testimony ...”

The State of Israel mapped out its course in accordance with that which has been set forth in Criminal Appeal 579/88, Suissa v. State of Israel, PD 44 (1) 529. As the State of Israel would have it, the Defendant did not object to having those witnesses testify, although he knew very well, as did his defense attorney, that their trial was not over. He did not bar – as he could have done, from the procedural standpoint – his accomplices’ way to the witness stand. By failing to do so, he knowingly waived his right to object to having their testimony heard, and he can no longer attack the admissibility of this evidence, which is *a priori* acceptable testimony under law (Section 2 of the Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731 – 1971), and all that is left to decide is the weight of that evidence.

This is indeed a foreseeable outcome, in accordance with the line of defense selected by the Defendant, and Counsel for the State of Israel should not be found at fault.

Because this is a foreseeable and probable outcome of the line of defense intentionally adopted by the Defendant, Counsel for the State of Israel is correct in stating that the responsibility for that outcome rests with the Defendant.

We questioned Counsel for the State of Israel in this matter, because we believed that she might raise the matter in order to “open the way.” Let us recall, however, that the State of Israel declared, at the beginning of each testimony, that none of the above mentioned witnesses had been promised any benefit whatsoever, and that it did not intend to use their testimony against them in any way whatsoever.

In any event, each of the Four was declared a hostile witness, and with regard to the testimony given by each of the above mentioned witnesses, we were asked to act in accordance with the provisions of Section 10A of the Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731 – 1971 (hereinafter, the “Evidence Ordinance”) and to give preference to his statement in writing, relative to his oral testimony.

There is accordingly some doubt as to whether the Kinzi doctrine applies under these circumstances, when the risks which underlie the doctrine do not exist.

[Stamp] P 5: 241

The manner in which the Four testified in Court, as shall be set forth below, was hostile to the State of Israel.

Witness No. 6 for the prosecution, [REDACTED], entered the courtroom, exchanged smiles with the Defendant and saluted him. From that point on, he expressed, both in words and in his behavior, his intention of not cooperating and not answering questions.

That is what he did, although he addressed us once, on his own initiative, and stated that, "I know the Defendant here and I put him above me." Furthermore, he answered a question by Counsel for the State of Israel: "Q. On December 23, 2002, were you in the military court, and did he [should read: did you] confess to this indictment, which I have now filed before this Court, including your involvement in the terrorist attack in Hadera?" "A. We wanted to stop the military operations, and they murdered the leader, [REDACTED] and they murdered Palestinian children, and that is what drove me to do this thing." Previously, he had argued that the indictment against him was falsified.

[Stamp] P 5: 241 [continued]

Witness No. 21 for the prosecution, [REDACTED], began his statement with the words: "I do not want to speak; I do not want to testify." He subsequently answered questions on matters of marginal importance, but did not cooperate with regard to material details. Thus, for example, he answered questions such as "When did you make the acquaintance of the Defendant?" or "In which military operation did you participate together with the Defendant?" or "Who was a member of the military squad of which [you were] also a member?" with the following response: "That is my own private business and it is of no concern to the Court." At the same time, after he was declared a hostile witness, he answered the following questions in this manner:

Q. Were you a member, from the beginning of the intifada, of a squad which carried out terrorist attacks, and, among other things, was the Defendant, Nasser Aweis, the person who was in charge of that squad?

A. What is wrong with those things? What is forbidden about those things?

Q. Did you tell the police that Nasser Aweis was the one who used to plan the implementation of the terrorist attacks, and that he was the one who used to supply the weapons to all of the squad members?

A. I have no answer.

Q. Did you tell the police that you participated in at least 10 shooting attacks against the Army in the Nablus area?

A. That is my right.

Q. Did you also tell them exactly where the shooting attacks were directed, toward the settlement of Elon Moreh, toward the IDF roadblock near Hawara?

A. I refuse to stand before this Court and be judged. There is nothing for which I must be judged. Whether I did or did not do – even if I did these things, there is nothing wrong with them.

Q. You are not the one being judged. You are testifying here and you have to give answers.

A. I refuse [to allow] Nasser to be judged for these things.

[Stamp] P 5: 242